FOOD MANUFACTURER LIABILITY AND THE CONSUMER’S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM by Magli, Carolina
Murcia, marzo 2016 
 
  
 
http://revistas.um.es/analesderecho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALES 
de 
DERECHO 
FOOD MANUFACTURER LIABILITY AND THE 
CONSUMER’S RESPONSIBILITY 
 In the Italian legal system 
CAROLINA MAGLI 
Phd, University of Bologna 
 
 
AdD 1/2016   Carolina Magli 
 2 
 
 
Resumen 
Desde el principio de este siglo, el Legislador europeo, consciente de los riesgos relativos al consumo 
alimentario, ha ido incrementando el rigor de las normas de Derecho público, con la finalidad de ofrecer 
a los consumidores una tutela preventiva que asegure la seguridad y salubridad de los productos 
alimentarios. De ahí surge la cuestión de identificar y graduar la conexión existente entre el Derecho 
público que regula la seguridad alimentaria y las previsiones propias del Derecho privado en el ámbito 
de los daños resarcibles. 
Palabras clave: Derecho de daños, Consumo alimentario, Derecho de consumo, Derecho europeo.  
 
Abstract 
 Since the beginning of this century, European Community lawmakers, aware of the risks associated with 
food consumption, have been increasingly tightening the rules under public law aimed at offering 
consumers preventive protection to ensure the health and safety of food products. The question that the 
interpreter poses, then, is that of ascertaining whether, and to what degree, a connection exists between 
public law concerning food safety - aimed at offering consumers preventive protection against damage 
to human health - and the provisions governing private torts law. 
 
Keywords: Tort Law, food consumption, Consumer Law, European Law. 
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SUMMARY: . I. THE RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC LAW FOR PROVING THE PRODUCT’S DEFECT OR THE 
MANUFACTURER’S FAULT.; II. THE LACK OF INDIVIDUALS’ DUTY TO TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES. III. 
TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL’S DUTY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY TO ADOPT REASONABLE 
LIFESTYLES (CONTINUED) 
 
I. The relevance of public law for proving the product’s defect or the 
manufacturer’s fault. 
   Since the beginning of this century, European Community lawmakers, aware of 
the risks associated with food consumption, have been increasingly tightening the rules 
under public law aimed at offering consumers preventive protection to ensure the health 
and safety of food products
1
. Thus, the horizontal legislation applicable to all foods 
(particularly important in this context is not only Regulation (EC) no. 178 of 2002
2
, but 
also the rules introducing the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
hygiene control system
3
) has been joined by the formation of specific provisions 
(referred to as “vertical legislation”)4 regarding particular categories of food products, 
such as for example milk
5
, eggs
6
, and pasta
7
. With reference specifically to the above-
mentioned regulations – the content of which is not to be detailed here8 – we must first 
ask whether they influence the interpretation of rules under civil law, and whether, then, 
public law concerning food safety can help the interpreter identify operator fault or 
product defect. Indeed, the new features introduced in the area of rules under public law 
concerning food manufacture and marketing have gone hand in hand with major 
innovations in the regulations aimed at protecting the consumer from the standpoint of 
                                                          
* Phd, University of Bologna. 
1
 COSTATO, Compendio di diritto alimentare, 6° ed., Padova, 2013, 426; TAMPONI, La tutela del 
consumatore di alimenti: soggetti, oggetto e relazioni, in AA.VV., Agricoltura e alimentazione tra diritto, 
comunicazione e mercato, Atti del Convegno di Firenze 9-10 novembre 2001, Milano, 2003, 301; 
PACILEO, Il diritto degli alimenti, Padova, 2003, 320. 
2
 Regulation (EC) no. 178 of 2002 set out the principles and the general requirements for food safety, and 
instituted EFSA. 
3
 Legislative Decree no. 155/1997 implementing (CE) regulations no. 852 and 882 of 2004. 
4
 MASINI, Corso di diritto alimentare, 3° ed., Milano, 2015, 167. 
5
 D.p.r. (presidential decree), no. 54 of 14 January 1997 (Decree abrogated – with the exception of articles 
19, 26 and annex C), chapter I, letter A), points 4 and 7 – by article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 193 of 06 
November 2007). 
6
 Legislative Decree no. 65 of 04 February 1993, implementing Directive EC 89/437 on hygiene and 
health problems affecting the production and the placing on the market of egg products (decree abrogated 
by article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 193 of 06 November 2007). 
7
 D.p.r. no. 187 of 06 February 2001. 
8
 For greater depth, see, among others, PACILEO, Il diritto degli alimenti, cit.; AA.VV., in Trattato di 
diritto privato agrario, diretto da Costato, Germanò, Basile, Utet, 2011; COSTATO, Il Reg. 178/2002 e la 
protezione dei consumatori di alimenti, in Nuovo dir. agr., 2002, 63; ID., La sicurezza alimentare 
nell’Unione europea. Note introduttive, in Le nuove leggi civili e commentate, 2003, I, 122. 
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private torts law
9
; the question that the interpreter poses, then, is that of ascertaining 
whether, and to what degree, a connection exists between public law concerning food 
safety - aimed at offering consumers preventive protection against damage to human 
health - and the provisions governing private torts law. First, it is a matter of 
establishing when the rules of diligence standardized in the horizontal and vertical 
legislation (as well as the so-called technical standards”10, which is to say the rules 
issued by European
11
 and national
12
 private “standardization” bodies that set forth a 
“state of the art” definition in the various productive sectors) can be relevant for 
identifying the operator’s fault (Art. 2043 of the Civil Code)13, and whether – in the 
context of the regulations on manufacturer liability laid down in the Consumer Code
14
 – 
                                                          
9
 It is necessary in this regard to bear in mind not only the regulations governing the manufacturer’s 
liability (d.p.r. 224/1988) – initially applicable only to foods processed by the industry but subsequently 
(with Legislative Decree no. 25/2001) also extended to “primary production”– but class action claims as 
well (Art. 140 bis of the Consumer Code). 
10
 Here, see BELLISSARIO, Certificazioni di qualità e responsabilità civile, Milano, 2011, 68; CARNEVALI, 
La norma tecnica da regola di esperienza a norma giuridicamente rilevante: ricognizione storica e 
sistematica teorica; ruolo dell’UNI e del CEI, in Resp. civ. e prev., 1997, 257. Generally speaking, 
industry operators comply with these provisions voluntarily; of importance in the area of food production 
are the guides to good operating practise for hygiene, in application of HACCP principles (articles 7-9 of 
Regulation (EC) 852/2004), developed by industry associations and standardization bodies based on the 
requirements indicated by Regulation (EC) 852/2004. 
11
 On this point, it bears keeping in mind that CEN (http://www.cen.eu//cen/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx) 
is a body that, thanks to the powers attributed by Directive 98/34/EC, lays down European technical 
standards for all productive activities (except for electrotechnology, which comes under CENELEC’s 
purview, and telecommunications, reserved for ETSI). 
12
 The Italian standardization organization UNI (Ente Nazionale Italiano di Unificazione 
(http://www.uni.com//it) is a private, non-profit association which carries out a regulatory activity in the 
industrial, commercial, and tertiary sectors (except for electronics, which is under the purview of CEI – 
Comitato Elettrotecnici Italiano). The website states that a standard is “a document that says ‘how to do 
things well’, guaranteeing safety, respect for the environment, and sure performance. According to 
European Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1998: a ‘standard’ is ‘a technical specification approved by a 
recognised standardisation body for repeated or continuous application, with which compliance is not 
compulsory and which is one of the following: international standard (ISO) European standard (EN) 
national standard (UNI) 
(http://www.uni.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=361&Itemid=936&lang=it&limit
start=1). Standards, then, are documents that define the characteristics (size, performance, quality, safety, 
organization, etc.) of a product, process, or service, in accordance with the state of the art, and are the 
result of the work of tens of thousands of experts in Italy and around the world”. 
13
 In this case, it will also be necessary to see whether failure to comply with the aforementioned 
legislative requirements is on its own enough to prove the agent’s fault, or if this circumstance simply 
determines a presumption of fault, aimed exclusively at inverting the burden of proof borne by the 
damaged party.  
14
 It is to be noted how rarely case law has ruled with reference to the damage caused by the consumption 
of foods. Particularly important among these decisions is the famous Saiwa case, in which the Supreme 
Court recognized the manufacturer’s non-contractual liability on the basis of Art. 2043 of the Civil Code 
(Cass. 25 May 1964, no. 1270, in Foto it., I, 1965, c. 2098). Specifically, in that setting, the Supreme 
Court judges stated that the merchant – which retailed foods contained in sealed packaging as received 
from the manufacturer (Saiwa biscuits, in the case in point) – is not to be held liable for the damage 
caused by ingesting these products when spoilt, if it is ascertained that the merchant bears no fault for this 
(such as, for example, poor conservation of the product). The Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) also 
found that once the merchant’s fault with regard to the sold product’s decay is ruled out, as in the case in 
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food legislation can also guide the interpreter in determining when a product is to be 
considered safe
15
 (Art. 114 of the Consumer Code)
16
.  
In this regard, it bears noting that failure to comply with food safety regulations should 
be automatic proof of product defect; likewise, it might be argued that the fault of the 
party causing the damage
17
 is proven in all cases where the party has failed to comply 
with food safety regulations
18
. Given, then, that violation of food safety regulations 
should on its own suffice to prove operator fault or product defect, it remains to be seen 
whether compliance with these safety standards is enough to consider a product safe, or 
whether this circumstance means no more than meeting a minimum level of safety that 
does not automatically relieve the manufacturer of liability. In other words, it is a matter 
of seeing whether the food manufacturer can be shielded from liability merely by 
demonstrating having complied with the food safety standards, or whether it is the case 
that while compliance with these standards is indeed a presumption of an absence of 
product defect, proof of this compliance is not in and of itself enough to free the 
manufacturer of liability whenever it is found that the manufacturer could have 
concretely prevented the damage event. On this point, it is to be noted that the first 
                                                                                                                                                                          
point, the judge can, in exercising his or her discretionary powers, follow a logical process of presumption 
to link the product’s spoilage to its fabrication defect as the only possible cause. Also, again by way of 
example, with regard to the judgments concerning the damage caused by food products, it bears noting 
that more recently, the Justice of the Peace in Palermo (Giud. Pace Palermo, 04 March 2011, La 
responsabilità civile, 2011, 390), in applying the regulations concerning the manufacturer’s liability (Art. 
114 and following of the Consumer Code), upheld the claim made against a producer of sliced sandwich 
bread due to consumption of the defective product that was in a clear state of decay (beyond the 
aforementioned cases where the product’s defect may be ascribed to the product’s decay, case law has on 
other occasions held the manufacturer liable for the damage suffered by the consumer upon discovery of a 
foreign body in the food, or the explosion of a bottle cap (Cass. 20 April 1995, no. 4473, in Resp. civ. e 
prev., 1996, 672)). 
15
 On this point, see also AL MUREDEN, Il danno da “prodotto conforme”. Le soluzioni europee e 
statunitensi nella prospettiva del Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in Contratto e 
impresa, 2, 2015, 389, which notes how the upcoming conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) suggests expanding the scope of observation to a perspective even broader 
and more complex than the one that embraced only the European Union’s juridical system. 
16
 PACILEO, Il diritto degli alimenti, cit., 151. 
17
 On this specific point, with reference to the damage caused by food consumption, consider for example 
the decision in which, following a case of food poisoning, the judges sentenced the defendant to 
compensate the plaintiff’s damaged health, due to its “having negligently conserved and served to the 
plaintiff a portion of spoilt tuna, in violation of the hygienic regulations for the sale and administration of 
foods and beverages” (Tribunale di Milano, 18 March 2011, in Redazione Giuffrè, 2011). 
18
 In this regard, part of the literature has drawn the distinction of compulsory and voluntary standards, 
underscoring that it would be necessary to consider a harmful product that was not made in compliance 
with the imperative safety standards established for it to be defective, while if the good does not comply 
with the non-compulsory provisions of law or of the standardization bodies, or with the non-binding 
safety standards, this nonconformity will represent exclusively an element that the interpreter will take 
into account for the purpose of assessing the existence of the defect (DI MARTINO, La tutela dei 
consumatori: sulla sicurezza e qualità dei prodotti, anche alimentari, in Scritti in memoria di Giovanni 
Cattaneo, Milano, 2002, 537). 
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interpretation set out above – the one according to which compliance with technical 
standards on its own shields the manufacturer from liability – appears to favour the 
manufacturer which, in fact, can be confident of bearing no liability whenever it has 
complied with public law concerning food safety
19
. Moreover, this solution results in 
assuming more predictable risk
20
 and therefore in lower insurance costs and a lower 
final price of the marketed good, thus stimulating competition among businesses. 
However, upholding an interpretation along these lines might discourage scientific 
research, given that manufacturers would be led to content themselves with the level of 
safety set forth by the technical standards (which, moreover, are not always up-to-date) 
because, in order to shield the manufacturer from liability, there is no need to place on 
the market products with safety levels higher than those established by the 
aforementioned standards. 
This being said, our legal system, which tends to place more and more responsibility on 
the manufacturer, appears to adhere to the second line of interpretation: that is, although 
compliance with the provisions set forth by the technical standards may constitute a 
presumption of the product’s safety, it does not, in and of itself, guarantee the 
manufacturer of being shielded from liability
21
. Although case law has few precedents 
                                                          
19
 With reference to the products in general, see CARNEVALI, Prevenzione e risarcimento nelle direttive 
comunitarie sulla sicurezza dei prodotti, in Resp. civ. e pre., 2005, 15 and following, according to which 
“compliance with harmonized EU standards means ‘safe product,’ and ‘safe product’ essentially means an 
‘unflawed’ product pursuant to Art. 5, d.p.r. no. 224/1988.” In other words, according to the author, “the 
product in compliance with the technical standards to which the directives refer (and therefore ‘safe’) is 
capable of passing the test of Art. 5, d.p.r. no. 224/1988, as to the user’s or the consumer’s legitimate 
safety expectations, without prejudice to any glaring gaps in the technical standards. 
20
 The importance of knowing the required safety level in advance is underscored by TRIMARCHI, Rischio 
e responsabilità oggettiva, Napoli, 1961, 50; COMPORTI, Esposizione al pericolo e responsabilità civile, 
Napoli, 1965, 20; ALPA, Responsabilità dell’impresa e tutela del consumatore, Milano, 1975, 289; 
CARNEVALI, La norma tecnica da regola di esperienza a norma giuridicamente rilevante, cit. 264 and 
following. 
21
 With reference to medical devices, see DI LORETO, I dispositivi medici tra regolamentazione di 
sicurezza e responsabilità, in Danno e resp., 2007, 2, 193. On this topic, see also CARNEVALI, 
Prevenzione e risarcimento nelle direttive comunitarie sulla sicurezza dei prodotti, cit., 2005, 15; ID., La 
norma tecnica da regola di esperienza a norma giuridicamente rilevante, cit., 1997, 257, according to 
which “compliance with the technical standards equals presumed existence of the safety requirements 
established by the special law, which equals meeting the consumer’s legitimate expectations, which 
equals safe product.” According to the author, compliance with technical standards is only one element 
the judge must assess to identify the consumer’s “legitimate” expectations, and the presumption of an 
unflawed good in compliance with the technical standards may be overcome if, for example, new, 
supervening risks not provided for in the EC directives are shown to have arisen, or the failure to update 
the harmonized EC standards is demonstrated. On this point, see also CUFFARO, in Codice del consumo, 3 
ed., 2012, 623, according to which the cause for exemption from liability established by Art. 118 letter d) 
is valid only in the case in which the defect depends exclusively upon compliance with compulsory 
standards or binding administrative measures, and finds no application in the case in which the law and 
the regulation set minimum safety standards (as normally takes place to obtain type approval or an 
authorization), since in these cases the manufacturer is fully able to introduce the improvements and 
innovations deemed necessary to make the product safe; MATASSA, sub. Art. 6 d.p.r. no. 224 of 24 May 
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concerning food products specifically – consider, for example, how the Supreme Court 
sentenced a soft-drink manufacturer to compensate the damage suffered by the plaintiff 
due to an exploding bottle cap, even though the good had been manufactured in 
compliance with the regulations in force
22
 – some rulings regarding other product types 
appear to side with upholding this line of interpretation
23
.  
In this regard, it should be noted that this solution – according to which compliance with 
safety standards, although representing a presumption as to the product’s “conformity,” 
does not automatically shield the manufacturer from liability – results in more litigation 
in this specific matter, and in less competitiveness among companies: since they cannot 
plan the expenses for conducting business in terms of compensating future damage, they 
will have to bear higher insurance costs – costs that will inevitably be carried over to the 
final price of the good. However, a line of interpretation aimed, as mentioned, at not 
exempting the manufacturer from liability in cases where the product has conformed to 
the technical standards, should give the manufacturer an incentive to invest more in 
scientific research and to place safer products on the market. From this specific 
standpoint, then, this line of interpreation appears, moreover, to be in line both with the 
spirit of European Community lawmakers whose aim is to provide the maximum 
protection for citizens’ health and well-being24, and with what has been stated by some 
European legislators; for example, the French legislature has expressly stated that “le 
producteur peut être responsable du défaut alors même que le produit a été fabriqué 
dans le respect des règles de l’art ou des normes existantes ou qu’il a fait l’objet d’une 
autorisation administrative” (Art. 1386-10), with the consequence that a product may 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1988, in NGCC, 1989, 564 and following; FRIGNANI, Responsabilità del produttore: il progetto di 
direttiva CEE e gli ordinamenti degli stati membri, in Giur. piemontese, 1985, 418. 
22
 Cass. 03 March 2005, no. 4662, in Danno e resp., 2005, 678; in the case in point, the explosion of the 
cap on a bottle containing gaseous liquid had injured the victim’s eye. 
23
 Thus, by way of example, in line with the orientation according to which compliance with safety 
standards does not relieve the manufacturer of liability for the damage caused by defective products, is a 
ruling by Tribunale di Milano against a toy pistol manufacturer for the damage caused by a minor (Trib. 
Rimini 31 December 2008, in Danno e resp., 2009, 4, 432; specifically, in the case in point, the damaged 
party, in opening a toy manufactured by the defendant, injured his eye due to a shard of rigid plastic used 
for the packaging). Also arguing from the same perspective is a Tribunale di Pisa decision recognizing a 
motorcycle manufacturer’s liability, even though the product conformed to safety standards (Trib. Pisa 16 
March 2011, in Resp. civ. e prev., 2011, 10, 2108, with note by Carnevali, and in Danno e resp., 2012, 67, 
with note by Bitetto); on those occasions as well, it was held that although compliance with these safety 
standards was a necessary condition for obtaining type approval or market authorization, it was not 
enough to shield the manufacturer from liability. 
24
 See, for example, “whereas” clause no. 2 in the Regulation (EC) no. 178/2002, which states that “A 
high level of protection of human life and health should be assured in the pursuit of Community policies”; 
“The Community has chosen a high level of health protection as appropriate in the development of food 
law, which it applies in a non-discriminatory manner whether food or feed is traded on the internal market 
or internationally” (“whereas” clause no. 8).  
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be considered defective even if it complies with the technical standards
25
. This is 
without considering that this solution – according to which compliance with public law 
should not be considered a prerequisite sufficient for automatically shielding the 
manufacturer from liability – is also consistent with the Restatements in the United 
States, which endorsed what are referred to as “per se principles,” affirming that 
violation of the so-called “product safety regulations” determines product defect per se 
(or is sufficient to ascertain the damaging party’s negligent behaviour), and compliance 
with “safety requirements” (referred to as “compliance with regulatory safety 
standards”), while proving diligence and the absence of product defect, does not 
represent a “conclusive issue,” given that the jury can always deem the manufacturer 
negligent, or the product defective
26
.  
 
II. The lack of individuals’ duty to take care of themselves. 
The very circumstance that the manufacturer may be held liable even in cases where the 
goods are in perfect compliance with public law means, in fact, that our system aims to 
place responsibility upon the manufacturer, and to give it an incentive not to place on 
the market goods that, although in line with the item’s safety standards, may be harmful 
to the consumer’s health. And thus, starting from this perspective - aimed precisely at 
holding the manufacturer increasingly accountable for the goods it has placed on the 
                                                          
25
 IANNUCCELLI, La legge francese sulla responsabilità da prodotto, in Danno e resp., 1999, 383; DI NEPI, 
Francia 1998 e disciplina europea della responsabilità da prodotto difettoso: è stato vero allineamento?, 
in Riv. dir. impr., 1999, 263; GHESTIN, Le nouveau titre IV bis du livre III du Code civil «De la 
responsabilité du fait des produits défecteux», JCP entreprise, 1998, 148. 
26
 Lane v. R.A. Sims, Jr., Inc. 241 F. 3d 439 (5
th
 Cir. 2001) (Federal Railroad Safety Act); Moss v. Parks. 
Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4
th
 Cir. 1993); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F. 2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P. 2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973); Gable v. Gates Mills, 784 N.E.2d 739 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003, according to which compliance with statutory regulation is relevant, and is 
probative of what a “reasonable consumer” expects, but does not immunize a manufacturer from 
liability); Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A. 2d 38, 51 (Conn. 1997), which states that “compliance with 
federal regulation may carry more weight with a jury than compliance with an industrial standard, 
because a federal regulation has the imprimatur of the federal government.” See also Feldman v. Lederle 
Labs., 132 N.J. 339, 625 A.2d 1066 (1993) where, with reference to drugs, it is stated that compliance 
with federal rules in the matter of warning information on the use of pharmaceuticals is not enough to rule 
out the liability of the manufacturer, which ought to have adopted additional precautions and informed the 
consumer from this specific standpoint as well; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. No. 06-1249, March 4, 2009, 
according to which, again with reference to the damage caused by pharmaceutical products, it is stated 
that compliance with the standards established by lawmakers did not shield the manufacturer from 
liability. Contra, see Miller v. Lee Apparel Co. 11/8/1994, which denied compensation for the damage 
caused by a polyester garment that had ignited in a particular situation, given that the garment in question 
was in compliance with federal flammability standards; Geier v. American Honda Company, 529, U.S. 
861 (2000), concerning the damage suffered by a driver due to the lack of an airbag installed in his car; 
the Court stated the principle according to which the manufacturer is not liable if federal law attributes to 
safety standards the role of “maximum limit” of safety (in the same sense, see also Morgan v. Ford Motor 
Co., No. 34139 (W.V. Sup. Jun. 18, 2009).  
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market - the problem then arises of investigating whether our system ascribes relevance 
to the consumer’s own responsibility as well; in other words, given that more rules 
under public law concerning food safety have resulted in more liability for the 
manufacturer – which, should it fail to comply with these rules, in addition to being held 
accountable under civil law, is subject to liability under criminal and administrative law 
as well –,27 it is necessary to ascertain whether strengthening the technical standards 
(especially those aimed at informing consumers as to the characteristics of the foods 
they consume) has also resulted in expanding the responsibility of consumers who 
nowadays are more aware of the risks associated with the foods they consume than they 
were in the past. This investigation takes on particular importance following the 
introduction of the recent regulation governing food labelling
28
, the goal of which is to 
make consumers increasingly better-informed as to the composition, origin, and 
nutritional properties of the foods they use
29
; in fact, EC lawmakers, aware of the 
growing attention given to food products, which are considered potential risk factors for 
                                                          
27
 On this topic, see FERRARI – IZZO, Diritto alimentare comparato. Regole del cibo e ruolo della 
tecnologia, Bologna, 253. 
28
 This is Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011, on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and 
(EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 
87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, in OJEU, 22 November 2011, L. 304. Application of the new 
labelling regulations is planned starting 13 December 2014, and, limited to nutrition labelling, starting 13 
December 2016. For an initial examination of the regulations, see DI LAURO, Nuove regole per le 
informazioni sui prodotti alimentari e nuovi analfabetismi. La costruzione di una “responsabilità del 
consumatore”, in Rivista di diritto alimentare, in www.rivistadirittoalimentare.it.; ALBISINNI, The new EU 
Regulation on the provision of food information to consumers, in www.rivistadirittoalimentare.it.  
29
 In practise, the new regulations intended to broaden and strengthen the previous labelling provisions; in 
this regard, consider how, previously, “nutrition labelling” was merely optional, and became mandatory 
exclusively if the label or, more generally, the advertising communication, was making nutritional claims 
(such as, for example, reference to a given food’s low calorie content) (Directive 90/496/EEC of the 
Council, of 24 September 1990, on nutrition labelling for foodstuffs, in OJEU, L. 276, 06 October 1990). 
The choice by European lawmakers to change the previous arrangement derives from the recent debate 
over nutrition which has led businesses to provide increasingly precise information on food products, and 
national authorities to support information projects on proper nutrition so as to encourage consumers to 
make well-informed choices. Nutrition information has become compulsory not only in light of the 
growing attention to nutrition, but also because the regulations appear to consider foodstuffs as potential 
health risks, and precisely for that reason labelling serves not only to describe the product, but as a sort of 
manual on how to use the item. 
The new regulations governing the nutrition declaration apply starting 13 December 2016; Foods placed 
on the market or labelled prior to 13 December 2016 may be marketed until the stocks of the foods are 
exhausted. However, in the case where food industry operators provide nutrition information on a 
voluntary basis between 13 December 2014 and 13 December 2016, they shall comply with the rules on 
presentation, and with the provisions of the regulation (in other words, food industry operators may 
decide to conform to the new provisions governing nutrition information prior to 13 December 2014 
instead of applying the regulations pursuant to Directive 90/496/EEC of 24 September 1990 on nutrition 
labelling for foodstuffs, provided that each provision is complied with). However, the mandatory nutrition 
labelling (which is to say if a nutritional or health indication is ordered, or vitamins and/or minerals are 
added to a food) must comply with the regulation’s provisions starting 13 December 2014.  
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human health, and to nutrition
30
, have on the one hand required companies to supply 
more accurate information on the food products placed on the market, while on the 
other hand developing information projects on proper nutrition, to encourage consumers 
to opt for more carefully considered food/nutritional choices
31
. In other words, given the 
ever-closer linkage between certain lifestyles and the occurrence of certain diseases
32
 
(for example, one may consider how obesity and excess weight are factors that have a 
decisive impact on an individual’s health, or how nutrition can influence the occurrence 
of certain types of tumours
33
), it is a matter of ascertaining whether consumers of food 
products, who are increasingly aware of the characteristics of the products they are 
using, bear a duty to adopt a healthy lifestyle, or whether the entire liability for the 
damage caused by the consumption of foods potentially hazardous to one’s health must 
continue to be borne by the manufacturer. For example, consider the case in which a 
person feeds constantly on products that are particularly – and above all, widely known 
to be – unhealthy, such as junk food, the prolonged consumption of which may result in 
the occurrence of certain diseases, at times quite serious; by way of example, this class 
of possible cases includes that in which an individual chooses to consume particularly 
sugary or fatty foods, which may damage the individual’s health, even seriously.  
To examine this problem in greater depth, it is necessary to take a brief pause, shifting 
our focus for a moment to public law, and to note that, in this specific context, the 
lifestyles adopted by the individual are in certain aspects irrelevant; in other words, 
                                                          
30
 Therefore, from this standpoint, by way of example, the aforementioned regulation, for the purposes of 
simplifying the food labels placed on the market and making them more comprehensible, indicates what 
the labels’ graphical features must be, and, starting 13 December 2016, requires companies operating in 
the food industry to inform the consumer as to the nutritional characteristics of the marketed product.  
31
 Consider, for example, how Italy’s Ministry of Health has promoted the “Guadagnare Salute” (“gaining 
health”) project aimed at improving the population’s physical well-being. As concerns businesses, 
communication of the indicative daily amounts of energy and nutrients for the individual products 
(“Guideline Daily Amounts”) has begun. 
32
 An individual’s lifestyle is known to have a decisive impact on his or her state of health; consider, in 
fact, that, according to World Health Organization (WHO) data, 86% of the deaths and 75% of the 
healthcare expenditure in Europe and Italy are determined by chronic diseases that share four leading risk 
factors – smoking, alcohol abuse, poor diet, and lack of physical activity – as their lowest common 
denominator 
(http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=659&area=stiliVita&menu=progra
mma). 
33
 The World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), whose mission is to foster cancer prevention through 
research and by spreading the results of that research, has formulated some recommendations for 
preventing cancer: 1) stay lean throughout life; 2) limit the consumption of energy-dense foods and avoid 
sugary drinks; 3) base your diet mainly on foods of plant origin, with relatively unprocessed cereals and 
grains at every meal, and a wide variety of non-starchy vegetables and fruit; 4) limit intake of red meat 
and avoid processed meat; 5) limit alcoholic drinks; 6) limit consumption of salt and foods processed with 
salt, and avoid mouldy foods; 7) aim to meet your nutritional needs through diet alone (www.ccm 
network.it/ebp_e_obesita/files/.../Dieta_e_Salute__WCRF.pdf).   
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within our system, from the standpoint of public law, the individual’s conduct appears to 
be of no importance, given that the individual is considered free to enjoy the self-
determination of making his or her own choices, and thus even to follow unhealthy life 
models. To confirm this assumption, we may consider, for example, how, within our 
system – unlike what takes place in other juridical settings34 – the individual’s lifestyles 
are of no relevance for the purpose of the delivery of care by the Italian National Health 
Service, given that healthcare must be guaranteed to all individuals regardless of how 
they have led their lives
35
; in other words again, even though life habits consciously 
chosen by the individual result in social costs that are transferred to society as a whole
36
, 
the patient’s failure to comply with “responsible” life models cannot, for the Italian 
National Health Service, be a criterion for establishing healthcare priorities when it 
comes to allocating resources. While this solution leads to results in application that 
may be unacceptable from the standpoint of popular sentiment (in fact, in a setting 
where resources are scarce, those that are employed to treat a person who has led an 
irresponsible life might be taken away to care for someone who has instead adopted 
appropriate behaviour informed by the principle of prevention), it bears stressing here 
that the reason why it does not appear possible to modulate medical care depending on 
the individual’s life choices lies mainly in the circumstance that our legal system 
appears to contain no social duty for individuals to take care of themselves. In fact, 
except for exceptional cases justified by the need to protect a higher interest
37
 (consider, 
                                                          
34
In this regard, see http://www.corriere.it/cronache/08_gennaio_02/santevecchi_0885b722-b901-11dc-
aa63-0003ba99c667.shtml), where it is stated that, in England, Prime Minister Gordon Brown “conceived 
of a ‘contract’ between citizens and the National Health Service that put the rules of behaviour in writing. 
This is a ‘constitution with rights and responsibilities’ based on which patients, to receive State-provided 
care, will have to do their part to prevent disease. In practise, smokers may be asked to quit, and the 
overweight to slim down.” The article also points out that “The ‘charter of rights and responsibilities 
connected with access to the public health service’ immediately raised the spectre of penalties being 
levied on patients who failed to comply by making poor lifestyle choices. As things stand, about one out 
of ten British hospitals refuses to perform expensive joint surgery on obese patients, or orthopaedic 
surgeries on heavy smokers who risk complications. In the region of North Staffordshire, for example, 
prior to a routine operation, patients must demonstrate not having smoked in the previous three months, 
and must have a given body mass index”; it must be said here that in England, very poor dietary habits 
have become a plague on society: in 25 years’ time, one half of the British population will be obese, and 
86% of men overweight, if the trend is not reversed. Insurance companies have announced they have 
begun offering policies discounted 75% to those who exercise regularly.” On this topic, see also 
http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=20671. 
35
 The Italian Health Service’s principles (Art. 1 of law no. 833/1978), beyond universality (healthcare 
must be guaranteed to all individuals without distinction of social conditions and income), also include 
that of equality: needs being equal, everyone is entitled to the same care. 
36
 On this point, see MAGLI, Diritto alla salute e stili di vita: La condotta del singolo può condizionare la 
modulazione del trattamento sanitario, in Contr. e impr., 2015, 6, 1316. 
37
 Again by way of example, consider the recent trends – chiefly in the United States – towards giving 
women the duty to adopt a suitable lifestyle (“reasonable care”) during pregnancy. In some American 
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for example, compulsory health treatments)
38
, from the standpoint of public law our 
legal system appears to require no duty of social solidarity to adopt a healthy lifestyle
39
; 
it must be noted that even though health is understood not only as a right but as a 
collective interest (Art. 32 Const.)
40, the individual’s right to enjoy free self-
determination with regard to acts affecting one’s own body, and thus one’s own person 
(Art. 32, paragraph 2 and 13 Const.) prevails over this social interest. To put it yet again 
in other words, once more with reference to our system’s lack of an obligation to follow 
a prevention-based life model, it may be appropriate here to point out that a reading of 
the third sentence of Art. 2 of the Constitution – in which the Republic “expects that the 
fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled” – may give 
rise to a principle of solidarity. By virtue of this principle, a person (understood as “uti 
socius”) – with the aim of increasing society’s development and, in particular, of 
securing collaboration from all citizens in order to obtain essential goods of common 
interest (such as, for example, scientific research, promotion of art and culture, as well 
as healthcare)
41
 – is given reasonable limits justified by the need to safeguard the 
general interest in requiring each person not to maintain behaviour injurious to the 
rights of others
42
. What is to be specified here is that although health (and therefore the 
individual’s adopted lifestyle which, in fact, has a decisive impact on his or her well-
being) represents an interest for society as a whole given that the consequences of these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
States, laws have been approved allowing the authorities to arrest and limit the personal freedom of 
pregnant women suspected of using substances (drugs, for example) that might harm the foetus: 
www.uaar.it/news/2013/.../usa-quando-diritti-feto-portano-carcere-donne). On this topic, see SUMMERER, 
Libertà della donna e tutela del nascituro. Il conflitto materno-fetale nella prospettiva del diritto penale, 
in Il governo del corpo, ed. Canestrari-Ferrando-Mazzoni-Rodotà-Zatti, in Trattato di biodiritto, directed 
by Rodotà-Zatti, Milano, 2011, 1623, which notes that in Italy, it has already been affirmed that in cases 
where there is a risk as to the birth of a healthy individual due to the behaviour maintained by the 
gestating mother, the judge may impose upon her all the requirements necessary to protect the unborn 
child” (see Trib. min. Firenze 28 August 2004, in Ragiusan, 2006, 263, in which, in applying this 
principle, the judges, to protect the unborn child, required the gestating mother – who was in grave 
psychiatric conditions – to follow the directives of the competent social service). 
38
 ALPA-RESTA, Le persone fisiche e i diritti della personalità, Torino, 2006, 85, which notes that our legal 
system tends to limit healthcare treatment; consider, for example, the regulatory developments with 
regard to drug addiction, and the fact that while the 1975 law provided for mandatory treatment (when 
drug addicts refused the medical care and assistance they needed, they were subjected to compulsory 
hospitalization or home outpatient care by Court order), the new law has ruled out any form of 
compulsoriness. On this point, see also AMATO, Obbligo di vaccinazione tra libertà di scelta dei genitori 
e interesse del figlio, in Famiglia e diritto, 2014, 4, 372. 
39
 SIMONCINI-LONGO, La Costituzione Italiana – Principi fondamentali. Diritti e doveri dei cittadini. 
Commento agli artt. 1-54, ed. Bifulco-Celotto-Olivetti, Torino, 2007, 664. 
40
 In fact, as mentioned on a number of occasions, protection of health is translated into social costs that 
impact all of society. 
41
 Corte cost. 31 December 1993, n. 500, in Giur. it., 1994, I, 322. 
42
 In other words, then, the individual cannot demand unlimited personal freedom, but is called upon to 
lend mutual aid and collaboration in line with the social solidarity that was expressly recognized by law 
for the first time in France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 
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decisions may have society-wide repercussions in terms of social costs
43
, and despite 
the tendency, also followed by our own system, towards placing increasing emphasis on 
the importance of adopting healthy lifestyles
44
, the aforementioned duties of social 
solidarity
45
 do not seem to include a general duty to take care of oneself, or even the 
duty to adopt a diet that focuses on prevention
46
; again in other words, even if the 
concept of solidarity can be broadly interpreted to infer other duties not enumerated in 
the Constitution, and given that establishing duties in addition to those constitutionally 
provided for remains the exclusive province of lawmakers (although not necessarily of 
the State)
47, it bears noting that our system does not appear to recognize an individual’s 
social duty to “maintain him or herself in good health”48, since, in the conflict between 
freedom of self-determination and the protection of physical integrity, the freedom to 
decide as to the acts that affect one’s own body prevails. 
Therefore, if our system, in light of the above considerations, despite recognizing a 
“right to health,” may be said to include no clear “duty to be healthy,” the individual 
then appears free to maintain those behaviours that have the effect of negatively 
                                                          
43
 Corte Cost.16 May 1994, no. 180, in Foro it., 1994, I, parag. 1634, which states, instead, that 
“Requiring users of motorcycles to wear helmets is legitimate, because the state’s interference in the 
sphere of the citizen’s freedom is justified to protect the health not only of third parties, but of the 
individual himself, whose impairment from the standpoint of disabling consequences and death impact 
society as a whole in terms of social costs.” As concerns the social costs associated with adopting an 
imprudent lifestyle, see MAGLI, Diritto alla salute e stili di vita: La condotta del singolo può 
condizionare la modulazione del trattamento sanitario, cit., 1316, where the problem is raised of 
investigating whether the individual’s conduct may affect how the health service’s care is delivered. 
44
 In this regard, see the above-cited conv. Law no. 189 of 08 November, of legislative decree no. 158 of 
13 September 2013 (urgent provisions to promote the country’s development through a higher level of 
health protection). This law, in addition to introducing some “provisions in the matter of the sale of 
tobacco products”(which, for example, raised the legal age for tobacco sale to minors from 16 to 18 
years), inserts into article 14-bis of law no. 125 of 30 March 2001 the following Art. 14-ter (Introduction 
of the prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors), pursuant to which “Anyone who sells 
alcoholic beverages has the obligation to ask the purchaser, at the time of purchase, to produce an identity 
document, except in cases where the purchaser’s adult age is self-evident. Unless the fact is a felony, 
anyone selling alcoholic beverages to minors under eighteen years of age shall be subject to an 
administrative fine of € 250 to € 1,000. If the violation is committed repeatedly, an administrative fine of 
€ 500 to € 2,000 is applied, with the suspension of business activity for three months.” 
45
 These include, for example, the right/duty to vote (Art. 48 Const.), the duty to defend the country (Art. 
52 Const.), and the duty to be loyal to the Republic and to uphold its Constitution and laws (Art. 54 
Const.). 
46
 SIMONCINI-LONGO, La Costituzione Italiana – Principi fondamentali. Diritti e doveri dei cittadini. 
Commento agli artt. 1-54, cit., 664. 
47
 Art. 23 Const. authorizes the law to impose further duties of a personal or financial nature (such as, for 
example, the duty to lend assistance to an injured or endangered person (Art. 593 of the Criminal Code); 
pursuant to a proper interpretation of the aforementioned reservation of law, it may impose additional 
duties only when they are functional to achieving the principle of solidarity or other interests protected by 
the Constitution. 
48
 PELAGATTI, I trattamenti sanitari obbligatori, Roma, 1995, 20; SIMONCINI-LONGO, La Costituzione 
Italiana – Principi fondamentali. Diritti e doveri dei cittadini. Commento agli artt. 1-54, cit., 664; 
GIUFFRIDA, Il diritto all’integrità fisica: art. 5 c.c., in Le persone, III, Diritti della personalità, Torino, 
2000, 71 and following. 
AdD 1/2016   Carolina Magli 
 14 
impacting his or her own physical integrity, and his or her own life. This includes the 
behaviour of adopting imprudent, unreasonable lifestyles that may, over time, prove 
seriously hazardous to ones own health; an unhealthy diet is one such behaviour
49
. What 
is more, a paternalistic system – in which the preservation of physical integrity is 
                                                          
49
 Moreover, again to confirm the aforementioned assumption – and thus the individual’s bearing no duty 
of personal responsibility – with reference to the limits to be placed on the disposability/non-disposability 
of one’s own body (on the point, see art 5 of the Civil Code, which prohibits acts of disposing of one’s 
own body not only when in violation of the law, public order, or decency, but also when causing 
permanent damage to physical integrity), it must also be said that adopting imprudent life habits – 
including ill-advised diets – can indeed, as time goes by, cause permanent injury to the individual’s 
physical integrity, even compromising his or her own life; however, not only does the legal system not 
impose upon the individual the duty to follow healthy life models, but – from an even more general 
standpoint – no obligation for a person to preserve his or her own life and physical integrity even seems to 
exist (VERONESI, Uno statuto costituzionale del corpo, in Il governo del corpo, cit., 140; CAVASINO, La 
flessibilità del diritto alla salute, Napoli, 2012, 182; contra, see DI PRISCO, Concorso di colpa e 
responsabilità civile, Napoli, 1973, 90, according to which “The code recognizes the principle of the 
protection of physical integrity as a two-way street: not only against offenses by others, but also against 
the acts of the subject him or herself”); indeed, our system protects these goods only against offenses by 
others, through recognition of a right of the person and not – except for exceptional cases justified by the 
need to protect certain higher interests – against the person him or herself by imposing an obligation of 
behaviour on him or her (DE CUPIS, I diritti della personalità, Milano, 1982, 146. With reference to the 
right to life and to physical integrity, see, among others, also RESCIGNO, Personalità (diritti della), in Enc. 
giur., vol. XXIII, Roma, 1991, 2; MESSINETTI, Personalità (diritti della), in Enc. dir., Milano, 1983, 358; 
ONDEI, Le persone fisiche e i diritti della personalità, Torino, 1965, 225; MATTEI-RUSCIA-ZANINI, Diritto 
alla vita e diritto all’integrità fisica, in Diritti della personalità. Strategie di tutela. Inibitorie. 
Risarcimento danni. Internet, Trattato pratico-operativo, ed. Ruscica, Padova, 2013, 275). Specifically, 
with reference to Art. 5 of the Civil Code, it has been observed that, in order to ascertain whether, with 
regard to acts disposing of one’s own body, the principle of free disposition or that of non-disposability of 
physical integrity prevails, it would appear appropriate to draw a distinction between cases where the 
effects of the act of disposition are not limited to the subjective sphere of the affected individual, but 
involve third parties as well (and this may occur, for example, because, to carry out the activity itself, the 
intervention of third parties, generally medical personnel, is required – consider surgical operations, for 
example – or when the act itself is aimed at placing the body or part thereof at the benefit of third parties, 
as with transpants), from cases where the act of disposing of the body is carried out personally and 
directly by the individual, with effects limited entirely to his or her subjective sphere (ALPA-ANSALDO, Le 
persone fisiche, sub. art. 5 c.c., in Il Codice civile commentato, directed by Schlesinger, Milano, 1996, 
252-253. Contra, see DI PRISCO, Concorso di colpa e responsabilità civile, cit., 93, according to which 
Art. 5 of the Civil Code protects physical integrity against the attacks that the individual may commit 
against him or herself, and that might permanently impair is or her integrity); therefore, while in the first 
case the conflict between the freedom of self-determination and the protection of physical integrity must 
be resolved based on a judgment of merit of the interests pursued, which takes the individual concrete 
case into account, in the second case – that is, if the act is implemented directly by the agent and its 
effects are limited to his or her subjective sphere – this conflict may be defined more generally in favour 
of the prevalence of the freedom to make decisions about one’s own body (ROMBOLI, Sub art. 5 c.c., in 
Comm. c.c. ed. Scialoja and Branca, Bologna-Roma, 1988, 241; ALPA-ANSALDO, Le persone fisiche, sub. 
art. 5 c.c., cit., 252); on the other hand, by following a different reasoning – that is, if we were to admit 
the existence of the individual’s obligation to take action to preserve his or her own life and physical 
integrity (thus a prohibition against freely disposing of one’s own body) also with regard to conduct 
maintained by the disposing individual, with consequences directly impacting his or her own subjective 
sphere – then, within our system, certain cases would have to be punished which, instead, represent 
expressions of a de facto freedom that the State must respect, and certainly cannot eliminate. Such is the 
case, as for example, with acts of self-harm (which, on the other hand, outside of the cases expressly 
determined under criminal law, are unpunished) as well as attempted suicide, which is by no means an 
offence of any relevance under criminal law (SEMINARA, La dimensione del corpo nel diritto penale, in Il 
governo del corpo, cit., 189; DE CUPIS, I diritti della personalità, Milano, 1982, 104; GIUFFRIDA, Il diritto 
all’integrità fisica: art. 5 c.c., cit., 115).  
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necessary as a function of the public interest, and a person is considered subjected to the 
State’s needs – might indeed admit a solution to this question that established a duty for 
the individual to maintain his or her life and physical integrity even in cases where it is 
a matter of the individual’s direct actions, with effects impacting the individual alone 
(lifestyles, in fact); such a solution, however, which would impose upon individuals a 
duty to take care of themselves, is certainly incompatible with a system like ours, 
founded upon the principle of personalism
50
, in which the person is placed at the centre 
of values, and within which the State has the duty to make an effort to guarantee the full 
development of the human personality
51
. 
 
III. Towards recognition of the individual’s duty of social solidarity to adopt 
reasonable lifestyles (Continued). 
While, in terms of public law, our legal system tends to remove responsibility 
from the consumer (and indeed, there is no possible way to impose upon the consumer a 
duty of social responsibility to adopt appropriate lifestyles, or even to maintain a safe 
and healthy diet), to the contrary, from the standpoint of private law, it appears that the 
trend is towards ever-increasing accountability, not only for the manufacturer
52
 but for 
consumers themselves, especially in those cases where they have been adequately 
informed and thus placed in a condition of making free and well-informed choices. In 
other words, although our legal system generally accords to individuals the freedom of 
self-determination, in certain settings it tends to hold the individual more accountable, 
recognizing his or her duty to take responsibility for his or her own choices
53
. To 
                                                          
50
 In other words, the suppression of the individual’s freedom of self-determination with regard to the 
protection of physical integrity and health – even when said acts of disposition have no impact on third 
parties’ juridical sphere and are carried out manu propria by the disposing party – would conflict with the 
very principles of the framers of our Constitution; in rejecting a nineteenth-century idea embraced by 
Fascism, according to which the interests of the State were to be protected before those of individuals, 
they preferred to give substantial precedence to the concrete person, with the consequence that the 
fundamental rights of individuals, unlike the rights functional to the collective interest, are guaranteed to 
the person regardless of the consequences for society as a whole (VERONESI, Uno statuto costituzionale 
del corpo, cit., 140). 
51
 ROMBOLI, Sub art. 5 c.c., cit., 241. 
52
 Which, in fact, as pointed out above, runs the risk of being held accountable for the damage even if it 
has placed on the market a product in perfect compliance with the technical standards. 
53
 In our legal system, the principle of personal responsibility is grounded in Art. 1227 of the Civil Code, 
whose first paragraph establishes the rule that compensation for the damage ascribable in whole or in part 
to the damaged party is to be denied or limited depending on the common causal link, while the second 
pargraph imposes upon the creditor a specific duty of proper behaviour, aimed at preventing the damage 
caused by the damaged party’s negligent behaviour (CATTANEO, Il concorso di colpa del danneggiato, in 
Riv. dir. civ., 1967, I, 460 and following.; COMPORTI, Esposizione al pericolo e responsabilità civile, 
Napoli, 1965, 87, nt. 111 e 194; SAPONE, Il concorso di colpa del danneggiato, Milano, 2007; CAFAGGI, 
Profili di relazionalità della colpa, Padova, 1996; FRANZONI, L’illecito, in Trattato della responsabilità 
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confirm this thesis, one need only consider, merely by way of example, the legal 
relevance given in tobacco litigation to the damaged party’s conduct, and that, in 
addressing this problem, the Supreme Court has stated that while on the one hand the 
consumer’s imprudent behaviour – and in particular his or her negligence as to adopting 
measures suitable to prevent the damage from occurring – has no bearing on the 
decision regarding fault or no fault liability, on the other hand said conduct is relevant 
for the purposes of determining compensation. Compensation, in fact, may even be 
entirely ruled out in all cases where the manufacturer can prove that this conduct stands 
as an independent and decisive causative agent in the relationship between tobacco 
retailing and the occurrence of disease. But even more recently, again with reference to 
claiming damages for tobacco-related harm, it has been stated that the class action 
seeking to hold the company liable for exercising the dangerous activity of 
manufacturing and selling cigarettes without adopting appropriate measures to prevent 
harmful consequences for consumers is inadmissible because it is patently unfounded: 
on the one hand, nicotine levels in cigarettes and the use of additives are respectively 
identified and authorized by European law; on the other, “standing between the cause-
and-effect relationship between the activity of manufacturing and distributing cigarettes 
and the damage event is the behaviour of the smoker/consumer/damaged party, who 
must be fully aware of both the health risks connected with and the addiction caused by 
smoking (known since the 1930s and clearly marked on every pack of cigarettes)”54. In 
other words, and in line with what has already occurred in legal systems different from 
our own (such as in the United States, in fact)
55
, the case law referred to above bears 
witness to a principle of self-responsibility becoming increasingly established in our 
system as well. This principle aims to make the damaged party aware of his or her own 
decisions, especially when it is a matter of life choices clearly and widely known to be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
civile, vol. I, 2° ed., Milano, 2010, 115, which notes that, in the matter of damage caused by the 
circulation of defective products, Art. 122 of Legislative Decree no. 206 of 06 September 2005 regulated 
contributory negligence in producing the damage between the actions of the damaged party and the 
manufacturer through reference to Art. 1227 of the Civil Code; the above-cited Art. 122 of the Consumer 
Code also aims to uphold the principle of the self-responsibility of the victim who has wilfully exposed 
him or herself to the danger).  
54
 Trib. Roma 07 April 2011, in Guida dir., 2011, 21, 20. See also App. Roma 22 January 2012, in Giur. 
merito, 7-8, 1577, which states that “if the smoker freely chooses to smoke while aware of the risks he or 
she is running, including that of addiction and dependence, he or she cannot complain of the harm 
suffered in that manner, given that, ultimately, he or she has wilfully chosen to acquire it.” 
55
 For more on “Big Tobacco litigation,” see, among others, PRINGLE, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An 
Account of the Forces that Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 wm Mitchell l. rev. 
387 (1999); JENSEN, From Tobacco to Healthcare and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting 
Unpopular Industries, 86 Cornell l. rev. 1334 (2001). 
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harmful to one’s health, like smoking56. 
This line of interpretation – which, to this writer, appears entirely embraceable in terms 
of aiming to hold the individual accountable for his or her own choices
57
 – also seems 
consistent with that upheld in the United States with regard to the damage caused by 
consuming junk food; indeed, while on the one hand the United States legal system is 
admittedly tending to devote ever-increasing attention to problems associated with 
consuming unhealthy foods, on the other it bears stressing that public opinion, with 
reference to this specific context, has yet to change, and is still anchored to the idea that 
any person with average prudence knows that excessive consumption of fast food is 
harmful to one’s health. In other words, as concerns the damage resulting from the 
frequent consumption of fast food, the attitude of lawmakers, judges, and – above all – 
public opinion is that while on the one hand the population’s health is a social and 
economic problem of particular interest, on the other hand any individual’s nutrition is 
thought to be a “matter of personal choice,” and thus consumers, who are well aware of 
the consequences of poor nutrition, must bear the costs in all cases where bad nutrition 
results in harm
58
.  
                                                          
56
 Compensation of the damage was denied at the first instance in the “Stalteri Case,” since the existence 
of a cause-and-effect relationship between the consumption of cigarettes and the occurrence of the 
pathology was not held to be demonstrated, as tobacco consumption was only one of the potential risk 
factors (Trib. Roma 04 april 1997, no. 7697 in Danno e resp., 1997, 750); Eredi v. Schiaratura v. Philip 
Morris Corp. Serv. Inc. e Ente Tabacchi Italiani, decided by Trib. Roma 11 February 2000, in Corr. giur., 
2000, 1639 (the second instance changed the final result of the judgments; see App. Roma 15 May 2006, 
in Riv. dir. proc., 2007, 234); also following this orientation was Trib. Napoli 15 December 2004, no. 
12729, in the case R.E. v. Ministro della Sanità, B.A.I, Italia, Philip Morris Corporate Service Inc. e 
Philip Morris Corporate Services Inc. e Philip Morris S.p.A., ibid, 2005, 645. Consistent with this is Trib. 
Roma, 04 April 2005, in Dir. e giust., 2005, 793. On this topic, most recently see Trib. Milano 11 July 
2014, in Danno e resp., 2015, 174. Compensation for damage caused by smoking was also denied by 
Trib. Brescia 10 August 2005, in Danno e resp., 2005, 1210; Trib. Roma 05 December 2007, in Foro it., 
2008, I, c. 985; Trib. Roma 28 January 2008, no. 1828, in Danno e resp., 2009, 1079. In the literature, see 
CAFAGGI, Immunità per i produttori di sigarette; barriere culturali e pregiudizi di una giurisprudenza 
debole, in Danno e resp., 1997, 753; FACCI, Brevi considerazioni in tema di danni da fumo, in Contr. e 
impr., 1999, 944; DI MARZIO, Danno da fumo passivo e nesso di causalità: giudici divisi, sentenze 
contrapposte, in Dir. e giust., 2005, 65. 
57
 On this point, see CALABRESI, Il costo degli incidenti e responsabilità civile: analisi economico-
giuridica, Milano, 1975. 
58
 Precisely with this in mind, state lawmakers have passed “obesity legislation” according to which a 
“food provider is not subject to liability for injury or death for a person’s long-term consumption of the 
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Therefore, in light of this perspective, to refocus our attention on our own 
system with regard to the damage derived from food consumption, it bears noting that, 
in this specific case as well, due relevance ought to be ascribed to the damaged party’s 
behaviour, as well as to the lifestyles he or she has adopted; from that standpoint, 
precisely in order to incentivize a demeanour that is wiser and more targeted towards 
preventing the occurrence of the damage event, if the damaged party has negligently 
contributed to producing the damage the compensation should be assessed in 
accordance with the criteria pursuant to Art. 1227 of the Civil Code (applicable by 
virtue of the reference made by Art. 2056 of the Civil Code to torts liability as well) and 
Art. 122 of the Consumer Code
59
. Thus, in light of these principles, in the decisions as 
to compensating the damage caused by consuming food products, the consumer’s 
awareness of the health hazard the product may give rise to (consider, merely by way of 
example, the case where the party claiming damage has consumed biscuits he or she 
knows are spoilt), as well as anomalous, unpredictable, or excessive use of the food 
product (such as for example the case where the consumer overeats a given food which, 
if consumed in excess, may be hazardous to one’s health) might be elements that can 
shield the manufacturer from liability
60
. Again from the same perspective, also in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 101 2008-2009. 
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suggested by the imagination and vivacity of its young users, but not those resulting from abnormal 
initiatives extraneous to the item’s typical function (Cass. 29 September 1995, no. 10274, in Danno e 
resp., 1996, 87; in Foro it., 1994, I, 251; in Resp. civ. e prev., 1994, 141, 517; in Giur. it., 1995, I, 2, 323, 
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defect has been manifested in connection with a mode of use thereof that is not among those reasonably 
foreseeable by the manufacturer”; in other words, the consumer’s behaviour – in this case, it was a 
twelve-year-old boy who seriously injured a finger – must be among those that the manufacturer could 
reasonably foresee in the abstract. In the case in point, the judges, having ascertained that the plaintiff, 
then a boy of twelve, had stood on the swing’s armrest, held that this type of behaviour was not among 
those that the constructor of the product and the municipality could have reasonably considered 
foreseeable, and found that only in the context of such a behaviour could the swing’s operation reveal the 
lack of safety that had given rise to the occurrence of the damage). 
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case where the consumer complains of damage resulting from the adoption of an 
imprudent life model that he or she could have avoided through ordinary diligence (and 
thus by adopting a healthier lifestyle), the damaged party should receive no 
compensation from the manufacturer if the victim’s conduct stands as an independent 
and decisive causative agent in the relationship between the food trade and the 
occurrence of disease, which is to say in the case where the party’s actions are on their 
own enough to determine the damage and rule out the causal link with the defendant’s 
conduct. Indeed, given these circumstances (and analogous logical/legal arguments may 
be made not only in the case of unwise and excessive use of foods rich in fats or sugar, 
but also, for example, in the case of alcohol abuse)
61
, the damaged party must be held 
accountable for having failed to base his or her own conduct upon the principle of 
personal responsibility through responsible behaviour and greater awareness, given that 
the dangers arising from the abuse of certain substances are part of the average person’s 
patrimony of knowledge
62
; it is in fact a well-known circumstance that certain food 
products (such as those high in fat and sugar)
63
, while not capable of causing harmful 
situations per se, may still be hazardous if the consumer negligently abuses them 
through constant and repeated use over time
64
. 
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